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devotee of the country, we should judge. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* But it must not be supposed that we for one moment deny great and grave ills. We are told that "the glory of their" (the operatives) "occupation is gone; the days when their labor was not a weary burden are over" (p. 50) . . . "While the machines have almost become human, the human tenders of them have almost become machines" (p. 55). I should be inclined to say that the burden is passing, and that the glory is to come in a greater degree. To invent a machine, to understand and control a machine, is not to be a machine; but to constantly repeat some few actions is to be a machine. To tend six looms in a modern weaving-shed has less promise of slavery than to cast the shuttle in the hand-loom weaver's garret. That the operative to-day has less control over his own actions than he had in the past we admit and deplore. But organization has always come at first with subjugation; and yet in politics it has culminated in democracy. Nevertheless, our author is pessimistic about the future of the factory system. He can "hardly think that it ever will be good" (p. 157). All we can say is that we dissent. But with a good deal that Mr. Clarke says we agree. Because of the above criticisms, it must not be supposed that we think Mr. Clarke has written a valueless book. On the contrary, we think that very much may be learnt from it, for it presents an aspect of the factory system which the more orthodox incline to overlook, just as our author inclines to overlook the more cheerful side which they see. Mr. Clarke has therefore done us a service, though we cannot agree with his conclusions. The book is well written, and a word of praise is due to the publisher.

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RELIGION IN GREEK LITERATURE. A Sketch in Outline. By Lewis Campbell, M.A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

As the title of his book indicates, Professor Campbell has been concerned not with Greek religion as a whole but with the larger conceptions and experiences of their leading poets and thinkers. With this in view, he travels lightly over the disputed question of early origin, recognizing different sources,—"aboriginal," Aryan, Phœnician, Egyptian,—but not committing himself to any estimate of their interconnection and relative importance, and passing on at once to a detailed account of religion as we meet it in Homer.

This is one of the most interesting sections in the book. Professor Campbell brings out forcibly the significant contrasts to be noted in the *Iliad*: the dearth of abstract reflection and yet the deep and vital sense of character and the movement of life; the capacity for enjoyment combined with the underlying pessimism of the dreary outlook after death; the inconsistencies in the picture of the gods, from one point of view limited and capricious individuals, from another types of elemental powers; above all, the striking opposition between the nobleness of the human figures and the pettiness of the divine rulers. There can be little doubt that Professor Campbell is on the right line when he says, "the humanity of the age had far outgrown its theology," and again, "the interest in human things was far more vivid than the traditionally accepted notion of things divine. The heart of man was deeply engaged in the former, while the latter touched only his imagination or his fear." The recognition of this remarkable severance between the imagination and the heart is of high value, and one could wish Professor Campbell had used this key to unlock other problems he has to face. The discussion of the *Odyssey* is less satisfactory. Stress is laid, it is true, upon the poem as a drama of retribution; but there is no mention of the striking conception of Athene as a guiding power at one with the resolution and wise endurance of the hero, nor yet of the delicate allegorical fancy that plays round the vision of Circe and the Sirens. Yet it is probably in these three points that we should look for the real difference in religious thought between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

In the work of Hesiod Professor Campbell recognizes the first attempt to make a coherent cosmogony out of the scattered myths, and the definite emergence of conscious reflection in a didactic form. No doubt the conquest of the new form may be considered as a step in development; but it is odd to speak of Hesiod's commonplace morality as containing "an ethical ideal in some ways more advanced" than the unconscious wisdom that created Hector and Odysseus and Nausicaa. Professor Campbell then proceeds to a cursory account of the ensuing age, alive with the forces of personal thought and feeling that were pressing on to a more satisfying religion, from the speculative ardor of Heraclitus and Xenophanes to the human intensity of Sappho. This leads him to Pindar and Herodotus, as summing up the life and culture of the early fifth century. His account of Pindar is minute, but somewhat disconnected and inconclusive. He admits that Pindar's morality is

“merged in opinion and convention,” and at the same time speaks of an “advance in ethical reflection” and of mystical and philosophic elements, without explaining how the different phases come to be manifestations of the same personality. The truth about Pindar, one might suggest, is that his thought, as thought, was shallow and prejudiced; but that his vivid sense of beauty sometimes helped him to wider views, made him reject the grosser myths or accept with glad sympathy the new hope of a glorious life beyond death. Herodotus, Professor Campbell puts in effective contrast with Pindar, the representative of “the forward movement” as opposed to the aristocratic conservative. He might perhaps have ventured farther and taken Herodotus as the very embodiment of the inquiring Greek spirit at its normal level, criticising the action of the gods, but content with a superficial justification, speculating in science and philosophy, but ready enough to accept, at least provisionally, any pleasing tale of superstition. This union of profound and shallow is well illustrated by Professor Campbell’s own words on the Herodotean doctrine of the “envy” of the gods, half “spiteful malignity,” half “just severity.”

Before dealing with the great Athenian outburst, Professor Campbell reviews the leading cults and beliefs that found a home at Athens. But the review is so discursive and the statements so vague that it is difficult to gather any clear idea of the varying tendencies at work. The most suggestive part is the account of Orphism, the belief in a child of Zeus, torn to pieces and devoured, mysteriously rescued by his father, and mysteriously present in the nature of men. It is disappointing, however, that nothing is said about the affinities of this doctrine with totemism on the one hand and Christianity on the other. Of the tragedians, it is evident that Professor Campbell is most in sympathy with *Æschylus*. He shows the final moralization under the poet’s thought of the old irrational Nemesis; and he has an interesting suggestion that the Promethean trilogy may have represented the progress from Chaos to Cosmos, and the final union of liberty and order. Professor Campbell gives Sophocles credit for originality as a religious thinker, but does not place him so high as *Æschylus*. He appears to hold that his characteristic note is a belief in one supreme will “working according to eternal law,” and guiding the noble spirits through suffering to redemption and peace in another world. Euripides is very hardly treated. Professor Campbell rejects the theory that the poet held the current mythology up to odium in the interests of a purer reli-

gion, and is content to see in him a somewhat melodramatic and superficial artist who simply reflected the chaotic speculations of his time, with only here and there flashes of higher thought. In this connection it is impossible not to notice with amazement that Aristophanes is passed over in silence, and is barely mentioned even in the description of Socrates. As regards the latter, Professor Campbell has a keen sense of the peculiar contrasts in his temperament, "the passionate nature held in absolute self-control," "the sceptical attitude rooted in an absolutely firm conviction of the reality of truth and justice;" but there is a certain looseness in the statement of his ethical and philosophical position which is apt to bewilder. What is meant, for instance, by saying that "in the white light of Socrates the several rays which colored later ethics were combined"? This does not help us to realize the essential incoherencies in the Socratic conception of the good, (so well analyzed by Professor Sidgwick in his "History of Ethics,") the incoherencies which made it possible for Stoic and Epicurean alike to claim him as their master. The transition to Plato and the account of Platonism as a philosophic whole suffer from the same indefiniteness; but Professor Campbell is at his best in his appreciation of this Platonic effort to see the world as the expression of one great intelligence, an intelligence that was essentially good, and with which man could be united by becoming just and righteous. The book is practically closed by a brief estimate of Aristotle's religious position. This Professor Campbell considers closely akin to Plato's, the main difference being the greater stress laid by Aristotle on the intellectual element in his conception of the divine: "the chief attribute in the God of Aristotle is not justice in the human sense, but the energy of pure contemplation."

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ROMAN SOCIETY IN THE LAST CENTURY OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE.
By Samuel Dill, M.A., Professor of Greek in Queen's College, Belfast. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

Professor Dill's avowed intention in this volume is to touch in with some detail the features of an age whose grand lineaments are generally familiar to us, the age of the final German invasions. What were people doing, thinking, and saying to one another at this critical period? Can we approach more closely to them as human beings, not as the mere material for the deduction of general